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Abstract: 
Institutional investor activism has received increasing attention for corporate governance 
scholars and policymakers. The promise of institutional monitoring of corporations has fueled 
social expectations over institutional investors. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, recent 
corporate governance rules have attempted to frame and rule institutional investors’ corporate 
governance behavior. We draw upon these rules and legal research to unpack the rationales of 
these specific expectations. Employing an institutional logics perspective, we map the different 
logics of responsibility which drive institutional investors’ corporate governance behaviors. 
This help us critically examine the notion of investor stewardship and propose a unified 
framework for institutional investors’ corporate governance responsibilities. First, we argue 
that the coexistence of contrasted logics creates new sources of conflicts of interests for 
institutional investors. Second, we remark that corporate governance rules for institutional 
investors do not meet social welfare concerns. We then propose a custodian logic of 
responsibility for institutional investors which combines monitoring concerns and a concern for 
responsible management. 
Keywords: Corporate governance - Institutional investors - Responsibility - Engagement - 
Stewardship 
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1. Introduction 
As management and organizational research has been increasingly concerned with “grand 
societal challenges” (Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015; George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & 
Tihanyi, 2016) and “social welfare” (see Academy of Management Review’s special topic 
forum on “Management theory and social welfare: contributions and challenges”, 2016), 
scholars have stressed the importance  of corporate governance’s specific ability to frame 
business structures, and then, contribute or restrain corporate social responsibility (hereafter 
CSR), (Bosse & Phillips, 2016; du Plessis, Varottil, & Veldman, 2018; Scherer & Voegtlin, 
2017). To this respect, scholars have called for stronger focus on corporate governance reforms 
and laws (Deakin & Hobbs, 2007; Deakin & Whittaker, 2007; Veldman, 2018).   
 
In the recent years, policymakers and lawmakers have shown a strong interest for institutional 
investors’ role in corporate governance. Institutional investors have become major players in 
corporate governance (Gillan & Starks, 2003; McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 2016; McNulty & 
Nordberg, 2016). Moreover, institutional ownership affects firm performance (Elyasiani & Jia, 
2010), dividend policies (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005) but also CEO compensation (David, 
Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Hartzell & Starks, 2003), R&D expenditures (Bushee, 1998) and 
firm innovation (Kochhar & David, 1996). Although institutional ownership cannot solely 
account for institutional investors’ influence on corporations  (Ryan & Schneider, 2002), they 
have shown a growing interest for corporate governance through shareholder voting at general 
meetings (Aggarwal, Saffi, & Sturgess, 2015) and shareholder activism (Goranova & Ryan, 
2014). In particular, institutional activism has had successful outcomes (Del Guercio, Seery, & 
Woidtke, 2008) and has been positively associated with financial performance (Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy, & Thomas, 2008; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Klein & Zur, 2009). Corporate governance 
codes dedicated to institutional investors, such as Stewardship codes, have then spread globally 
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(Cuomo, Mallin, & Zattoni, 2016). At European Union level, the Directive 2017/828, which 
promotes long-term shareholder engagement, also proposes guidelines to hold institutional 
investors accountable for their corporate governance practices (Birkmose, 2014; Johnston & 
Morrow, 2015). The promise of institutional investors’ engagement with corporations as 
“watchdogs” or “guardians” of corporate governance is not a new topic (Tricker, 1998). 
However, the notion of “investor stewardship” fuels expectations to renew capitalism (Davis, 
Lukomnik, & Pitt-Watson, 2009; Heineman & Davis, 2011) and foster “good activism”(Hill, 
2017). Shareholder engagement can contribute to the creation, diffusion and adoption of CSR 
norms and standards by corporations (Sjöström, 2010). Stewardship challenges the engagement 
behaviors of investors concerned with Environmental, Social and Governance (hereafter ESG) 
(Ivanova, 2017). 
 
Yet, institutional investors’ involvement in corporate governance has also met several 
criticisms.  In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, institutional investors’ role in 
corporate governance failures has been under heightened scrutiny (Commission, 2011). On one 
hand, institutional investors were condemned for their passivity and their lack of engagement 
with corporations (Hawley, Kamath, & Williams, 2011). On the other hand, institutional 
investors’, and in particular hedge funds’, behaviors have also been condemned for driving 
corporate short-term strategies (Coffee & Palia, 2015; Dallas, 2011).  Institutional investors are 
heterogeneous shareholders and their diverse strategies (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 
2010) affects their engagement practices (Aguilera, Florackis, & Kim, 2016; McNulty & 
Nordberg, 2016; Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Tilba & McNulty, 2013). Hence, the old question of 
“who will guard the guardians” (Coffee, 1991; Tricker, 1998) remains. Moreover, promoting 
and incentivizing institutional investors’ involvement in corporate governance does not 
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guarantee in itself responsible corporate governance practices for responsible businesses. Do 
recent corporate governance rules meet social expectations over investor engagement?  
 
In this article, we draw on these recent corporate governance trends and on legal research to 
shed light on what underpins - to date - investor stewardship and more broadly responsible 
institutional investor engagement. To this regard, we map the different logics of responsibility 
that can drive institutional investors’ corporate governance behavior. This leads us to propose 
a unified framework for institutional investors’ corporate governance responsibilities and to 
point out the absence of a specific logic of responsibility for social welfare concerns.  
 
First, we explain the origins of new corporate governance rules for institutional investors with 
some historical elements, building on a multidisciplinary review of literature – from the 
financial, managerial and legal corporate governance streams. We illustrate our analysis with a 
special focus on the UK Stewardship Code, which has initiated a corporate governance trend 
(Cuomo et al., 2016). 
Secondly, we unravel the rationales behind the novel responsibilities that policymakers and 
regulatory agents have assigned to institutional investors. For this purpose, we resort to the 
institutional logics perspective (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) which helped us 
distinguish between the different, coexisting and contrasted logics of responsibility for 
institutional investors in corporate governance.  
Finally, we critically examine the notion of “investor stewardship”. We complete our 
conceptual mapping arguing for a custodian investor logic with respect to firm and social 
welfare.   
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Legal theories and legal concepts have proven to be valuable for research in corporate 
governance (Lan & Heracleous, 2010) and institutional investment (Sandberg, 2013). The legal 
developments and corporate governance rules for institutional investors’ role in corporate 
governance offer an unique opportunity to answer queries to unpack the specific requirements 
and goals of investor engagement (eg. Tricker, 1998; Webb, Beck, & McKinnon, 2003).Our 
analysis then first contributes to the literature on institutional investor activism (eg. Goranova 
& Ryan, 2014). A conceptual mapping of logics of responsibility for institutional investors  
clarifies the multiple rationales that can drive institutional investors’ corporate governance 
behaviors. Second, we contribute to the literature supporting a positive and promising role of 
institutional investors for corporate governance (eg. Davis et al., 2009; Fenwick & Vermeulen, 
2018; McNulty & Nordberg, 2016) thanks to our discussion of investor stewardship’s limits 
and perspective, and to our proposition of a “custodian” stewardship. 
 
2. Corporate governance rules for institutional investors: an historical perspective 
2.1.  The evolving role of institutional investors in corporate governance 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Berle and Means characterized American modern 
corporations by the separation of ownership from control (Berle & Means, 1932). Shareholders 
were hence described as dispersed actors which had been deprived from access to control of 
corporations. From the 1940s to the 1970s, corporations and corporate governance experienced 
a “managerialist” era (Cheffins, 2015). This era marked the dawn of managers’ power but also 
the surge of managerial misconducts and corporate governance scandals (Cheffins, 2015).  
 
In the late 1970s, economists analyzed the separation of ownership from control as an agency 
problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory posits that in an principal-agent 
relationship, agents, as utility-maximisers, behave opportunistically if their interests are not 
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aligned with their principal’s ones (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Jensen and Meckling’s agency theory 
of the firm assert that shareholders, as principals, bear the agency costs incurred by managers’ 
behaviors and costs to monitor and incentivize them (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
Since the beginnings of modern corporations, executive managers and directors have appeared 
to behave opportunistically. They have conflicted with shareholders’ interests (Gordon, 2006). 
For instance, instead of distributing dividends to shareholders, managers have hoarded cash or 
invested in supposedly suboptimal projects (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, they were condemned 
for management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989) and board (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005) entrenchment 
practices, which have been deemed costly for corporations and their shareholders.  
 
In contrast, agency theorists deemed that shareholders held very little power over management 
in the corporate governance component of modern corporations as described by Berle and 
Means (Fama & Jensen, 1983). There has been precedents of shareholder activism between the 
1930s and the 1970s (Marens, 2002). For example, early shareholder activists contested levels 
of executive compensations after Wall Street Crash of 1929 (Wells, 2010).  Yet, the Securities 
Exchange Act (SEA) and later the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) have restricted the 
usage of their main tools- shareholder proposals at annual general meetings. Shareholder 
resolutions should only deal with “proper subjects for action by securities holders” (Liebeler, 
1984) and not concern “ordinary business matters” (Ryan, 1988).  
 
Moreover, only large shareholders were supposed to have enough incentives to actively monitor 
corporations (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Before the 1980s, institutional investors did not have 
the incentives to engage. Their share in corporate ownership was relatively modest (Gillan & 
Starks, 2007) and it seemed that institutional investors preferred “liquidity”, and the ability to 
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sell their shares, to “control”(Coffee, 1991). Institutional investors were mostly passive and 
shareholder activists were individual shareholders, which managers called “gadflies” (Marens, 
2002). Rather than shareholder activism, corporate governance scholars hence preferred other 
mechanism to discipline managers, such as takeovers and the “market for corporate control” 
(eg. Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1990). 
 
Nonetheless, this same “market for corporate control” broke institutional investors’ passivity 
(Cheffins, 2015). During the 1980s and 1990s, the takeover waves threatened managerial 
power. With the support of courts and antitakeover laws, managers responded to this threat with 
antitakeover devices, such as poison pills. Antitakeover laws and amendments stirred up the 
“shareholder rights agenda” (Bratton & Wachter, 2010). Beyond management control, 
takeovers could benefit institutional investors’ financial interests. Acquirers, and among them 
hostile acquirers, would make tender offers to shareholders, which institutional investors 
wanted the ability to accept and receive a premium on their shares (Cheffins, 2015). 
Institutional investors hence began to engage in shareholder activism. In 1985, an alliance of 
major institutional investors created the Council for Institutional Investors, the first association 
in the United States to represent institutional investors’ interests. The same year, the first proxy 
advisory agency -Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)- was created (Black, 1990) to advise 
institutional investors on how to best protect their interests when they vote at general meetings. 
Davis and Thompson read the progressive union of institutional investors as the emergence of 
a “social movement” (Davis & Thompson, 1994).  
 
For some legal scholars, this new class of shareholders - more skilled, more professional and 
with larger means than “gadflies”- could fill the gap left by corporate governance mechanisms 
deemed inefficient and could properly monitor corporations (Black, 1991, 1992). The “case for 
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shareholder empowerment” gained more advocates (eg. Bebchuk, 2004; Dent, 1989). To this 
regard, the first cases of institutional activism were promising. CalPERS, a major American 
pension fund, showed that institutional investors could engage in activism and target poorly 
performing corporations (Smith, 1996). But institutional investor activism did not convince 
every legal scholars (Thomas, 2008) and most investors remained passive (Cheffins, 2015).  
 
In the 2000s, the sudden emergence of hedge funds in corporate ownership revived the debate 
of investors’ role in corporate governance. Many hedge funds began to show interest in 
corporate governance (Partnoy & Thomas, 2006). Unlike “gadflies”, they have sufficient means 
and, unlike classical institutional investors, they have sufficient incentives for shareholder 
activism (Bratton & Wachter, 2010). Hedge fund activism has been positively correlated to 
share performance (Brav et al., 2008). Shareholder empowerment advocates have therefore 
praised their positive influence on corporate governance (Bebchuk, 2013; Illig, 2007), and 
notably their ability to lead institutional investors, who tend to vote with hedge funds (Gilson 
& Gordon, 2013).   
 
However, the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 curbed this enthusiasm for institutional 
investor activism. Regulators have held corporate governance failures accountable, as much as 
the lack of supervision on financial markets  (Commission, 2011). Firstly, empirical studies 
showed that institutional investors contributed to disseminating the crisis (Manconi, Massa, & 
Yasuda, 2012). Secondly, they did not assume the promised monitoring role over corporations 
(Hawley et al., 2011). Thirdly, banks would have engaged in risky strategies because of the 
increased focus on financial performance and share prices (Bratton & Wachter, 2010), which 
would have been stimulated by takeover waves and shareholder activism (Dallas, 2001). In 
particular, hedge funds were said to be short-term investors who foster managerial myopia 
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(Dallas, 2011; Lipton & Savitt, 2007; Strine Jr, 2010). Moreover, hedge fund activism have 
served opportunistic strategies (Anabtawi & Stout, 2008). For instance, they have resorted to 
empty voting (Hu & Black, 2007) and other financial innovations that can distort proxy voting 
outcomes (Partnoy & Thomas, 2006).  
 
More than hedge funds’ aggressive activism, policymakers regretted the lack of involvement 
of institutional investors in disciplining managers (Birkmose, 2014). The financial crisis thus 
put investor engagement on the regulatory agenda. The United Kingdom lead the first attempts 
with the issuance in 2010 of the first version of the UK Stewardship Code.   
 
2.2. Regulating  investor’s corporate governance responsibilities: the UK experience 
After a spate of corporate governance failures, the United Kingdom launched successive 
reforms of its corporate governance rules. Beginning with Coloroll’s collapse in 1990 and Polly 
Peck’s one in 1991, the 1991 Cadbury committee initiated several study groups and reports that 
resulted in the issuance of the first corporate governance code in 1992. The code focused on 
the role played by directors in monitoring corporations (Dahya & McConnell, 2007). The first 
revision of the Cadbury report by the Hampel Committee in 1995 included institutional 
investors in the discussions. At the beginning of the 1990s, institutional investors voting rates 
were quite low (Roach, 2011). The corporate governance code of 1998 then insisted on the 
importance of institutional voting and dialogue between investors and managers (Cheffins, 
2010). In 2001, the Myners report on institutional investors regretted the lack of involvement 
of investors in corporate governance. The report triggered the formation by institutional 
investors of the Institutional Shareholders Committees (ISC), which gathers the largest 
associations of institutional investors. The ISC published guidelines for institutional investors, 
promoting shareholder activism. These guidelines endorsed institutional monitoring over 
 10 
corporations and encouraged institutional investors’ accountability on the process and results 
of institutional monitoring. Consequently, the revision of the Hampel report by the Higgs report 
advised institutional investors to follow ISC guidance (Cheffins, 2010). At this stage, ISC’s 
corporate governance code for institutional investors still remained an investor-led initiative 
(Hill, 2017).  
 
ISC’s guidance was questioned after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. In particular, 
policymakers condemned institutional investors’ passivity as well as the inefficiency of the ISC 
guidelines (Roach, 2011). In April 2009, Lord Myners, who authored the Myners Report, called 
institutional investors “absentee landlords” in a speech as Financial Services Secretary to the 
Treasury (Cheffins, 2010). Consequently, in November 2009, the ISC issued a Code on 
Institutional Investors Responsibilities. The code drew institutional investors’ attention on 
long-term stakes and on financial risks. The same year, the Walker report on corporate 
governance practices in the banking system praised the ISC code and advised institutional 
investors to follow what he called a “stewardship code”. The government hence entrusted the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) with the issuance and the reporting of such a code (Roach, 
2011). In 2010, the FRC issued the UK Stewardship Code for institutional investors, which 
aims at fostering institutional engagement and monitoring of corporations. Since, the UK 
Stewardship Code has inspired other countries to issue their own Stewardship Codes (Cuomo 
et al., 2016) and was also used as a basis for discussion at the European Union level to amend 
the law on shareholder rights and shareholder engagement (Birkmose, 2014). 
 
 Recent legal trends in corporate governance are then conveying and defining institutional 
investors’ ideal monitoring role. This role is notably determined by the novel idea of 
shareholder duties (Birkmose, 2014; Cheffins, 2010) or “stewardship responsibilities” (see UK 
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Stewardship Code, 2012 : 1). These new expectations for institutional shareholding revise the 
classical corporate law perspective of corporations, which has been grounded on shareholders’ 
limited liability (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1985). Some legal scholars have indeed argued that 
the 2010 UK Stewardship Code brought about a change of paradigm in corporate governance, 
for it shifts the regulatory agenda from shareholder rights to shareholder responsibilities 
(Birkmose, 2014; Cheffins, 2010; Chiu, 2011). In this respect, the UK Stewardship Code did 
evolve from an investor-led initiative to a piece of soft law at the government’s request (Hill, 
2017). 
 
Having presented some historical components to explain the appearance of and the motives for 
new corporate governance rules on institutional investor engagement, we now propose to 
unravel the rationales behind the specific responsibilities propelled upon institutional investors.  
 
3. Institutional investors’ corporate governance responsibilities: a blend of multiple 
logics 
3.1.  Institutional investors and the “good activism” hypothesis 
Institutional investors’ corporate governance responsibilities, such as “stewardship 
responsibilities”, encompass several monitoring activities of corporations (Hill, 2017). For 
instance, the revised version of the UK Stewardship Code posits that “stewardship activities 
include monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as strategy, performance, 
risk, capital structure, and corporate governance, including culture and remuneration. 
Engagement is purposeful dialogue with companies on those matters as well as on issues that 
are the immediate subject of votes at general meetings” (UK Stewardship Code, 2012 : 6). To 
this regard,  the UK Stewardship Code requires institutional investors to disclose their corporate 
governance practices as well as it determines what these practices ought to be. 
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It defines seven principles:  
“So as to protect and enhance the value that accrues to the ultimate beneficiary, 
institutional investors should: 
1. publicly disclose their policy on how they will discharge their stewardship 
responsibilities. 
2.  have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation to stewardship 
which should be publicly disclosed. 
3. monitor their investee companies. 
4. establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their stewardship 
activities. 
5. be willing to act collectively with other investors where appropriate. 
6. have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity. 
7. report periodically on their stewardship and voting activities.” 
(UK Stewardship Code, 2012 : 5) 
 
The Code hence rules different dimensions of institutional investors’ involvement in corporate 
governance from voting, to monitoring and collective engagement. It supports relevant 
escalation of investor activism and it insists on the precedence of the interests of investors’ 
beneficiaries and clients while managing conflicts of interests (see UK Stewardship Code, 2012 
: 6).  
 
Yet, stewardship responsibilities does not simply revert to fiduciary responsibilities of 
institutional investors as financial intermediaries (Chiu, 2011). According to Chiu, the UK 
Stewardship Code wavers between an affirmation of fiduciary duties and a radical shift of 
corporate governance model, where institutional investors work for the common good (Chiu, 
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2011). “Stewardship aims to promote the long term success of companies in such a way that 
the ultimate providers of capital also prosper. Effective stewardship benefits companies, 
investors and the economy as a whole” (UK Stewardship Code, 2012 : 1). Investor stewardship 
should then contribute as much to their beneficiaries and clients’ welfare than to corporations’, 
other investors’ and general welfare. The UK Stewardship Code then assumes that investor 
stewardship aligns and pursues the interests of these different “stakeholders”. This strong 
assumption can be tracked back to  advocates of “shareholder value maximization” who have 
argued that shareholder value maximization is an adequate corporate objective since 
shareholders are residual claimants and that shareholder profits mean that each stakeholder has 
already been taken care of  (eg. Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). In the United 
Kingdom, the 2006 Company Act promotes the concept of “enlightened shareholder value” 
which extend the approach of shareholder value to long-term and extra-financial criteria 
(Harper Ho, 2010). 
 
Therefore, stewardship codes are not only about making passive investors engage with 
corporations and care for their beneficiaries and clients. Institutional investors should also 
prevent financial crisis which would be detrimental to each of their stakeholders. They should 
“endeavour to identify at an early stage issues that may result in a significant loss in investment 
value” (UK Stewardship Code, 2012 : 7). Stewardship codes expect investor engagement to 
help monitoring risk, contribute to value-creation and thus engage in “good” activism (Hill, 
2017).  
 
This “good activism” hypothesis is not just a legal utopia. For some management scholars, 
investor stewardship could provide an opportunity to renew capitalism and the responsible 
monitoring of corporations (Davis et al., 2009; Heineman Jr & Davis, 2011). The notion of 
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investor stewardship indeed invites to a positive narrative on shareholders’ engagement. From 
a symbolical point of view, stewardship refers to an ethical, and even religious, background 
(eg. Saltman & Ferroussier-Davis, 2000; Sherkat & Ellison, 2007). In management science and 
organizational psychology, stewardship theory is a management theory which takes an “other-
regarding perspective” (Hernandez, 2012). It challenges agency theory’s assumption that 
human beings are only self-maximising and opportunistic individuals (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Yet investor stewardship endorses shareholder 
activism, which has mainly been viewed as a control mechanism consistent with agency theory 
(Goranova & Ryan, 2014; McNulty & Nordberg, 2016). Contrarily to agency theory, 
stewardship theory would foster collaborative mechanisms in corporate governance 
(Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Investor activism and stewardship theory had then seemed at 
odd with each other.  To fill this gap, McNulty and Nordberg have proposed a framework for 
collaborative engagement based on “psychological ownership” (McNulty & Nordberg, 2016), 
a concept imported from Hernandez’s propositions on the antecedents of stewardship behaviors 
(Hernandez, 2012). As psychological owners, steward investors would have an affective 
relationship to corporations and then assume a pro-social role in corporate governance. Some 
stewardship codes, such as the South-African one, the Japanese one and the International 
Corporate Governance Network, have for instance emphasized the role of institutional investors 
in contributing to environmental, social and governance (ESG) corporate policies (Hill, 2017). 
Stewardship challenges the engagement behaviors of investors concerned with ESG issues 
(Ivanova, 2017).  
 
The notion of investor stewardship can then fuel the “good activism” hypothesis. Yet, “good 
activism” frameworks, such as the one developed by McNulty and Nordberg, rely on a 
voluntary approach of shareholder activism by investors (McNulty & Nordberg, 2016). It 
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assumes institutional investors have motives to engage in “good activism”. In agency theory, 
investor activism also relies on voluntary action by shareholders that have the most incentives 
to monitor corporations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Professor 
Birkmose argues therefore that there are no theoretical backgrounds to found investors’ 
responsibilities to monitor and engage with corporations, neither in ownership approaches of 
the corporations, neither in their critics (Birkmose, 2018). 
 
The positive narrative on institutional investors, which policymakers have adopted, has then 
been criticized (Hill, 2017). For instance, since the UK Stewardship Code relies on a voluntary 
“comply or explain” basis, its practical efficiency has appeared doubtful (eg. Cheffins, 2010). 
According to some legal scholars, policymakers should not endorse institutional investors’ 
empowerment through monitoring (Bruner, 2010). Indeed, investor empowerment would rely 
on an incorrect image of institutional investors. They are not passive shareholders and have 
contributed -with impunity- to the financial crisis (Dignam, 2012).  
 
More than the distinction between active and passive shareholder, policymakers draw here an 
implicit and unclear line between “good” and “bad” activists. Institutional investor engagement 
in corporate governance is a mechanism that can serve different objectives. Institutional 
investors’ heterogenous demands toward corporations (Connelly et al., 2010) indeed make it 
difficult to assess institutional investor activism as a coherent and homogeneous phenomenon. 
Although regulatory initiatives such as stewardship codes aim at unifying institutional 
investors’ behaviors, they fail to explain how and why investor engagement would align and 
serve social welfare. Not only investor stewardship refers to positive narratives on shareholders, 
it appears as an ambiguous notion. Pursuing the interest of their beneficiaries and clients can 
conflict with the corporations’ and other investors’ interests. Institutional investors seem more 
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concerned with their portfolio’s performance than with the performance of a single corporation 
within this portfolio (Gilson & Gordon, 2013). Moreover, grounding in fiduciary duties 
investors’ concern for long-term, environmental and social issues can be deemed as an abusive 
interpretation of fiduciary duties (Sandberg, 2013). For instance, mutual funds have adopted a 
“performance logic” and developed short-term and cost-cutting strategies to attract and keep 
their customers (Lounsbury, 2007).  Investors’ social welfare concerns appeal to other logics 
than alignment with beneficiaries and clients’ interests. The literature had already highlighted 
that expectations for institutional investors would need unpacking (Tricker, 1998; Webb et al., 
2003). Recent corporate governance rule in favour of “good activism” do not differ.  
 
3.2. Institutional investors’ multiple logics of responsibility  
Stewardship responsibilities, such as other regulatory initiatives regarding institutional 
investors’ role in corporate governance, creates new challenges for corporate governance. They 
“force shareholder engagement” upon institutional investors and upon corporations without 
clear theoretical grounding (Birkmose, 2018).  
 
In order to unpack the rationales behind institutional investors’ corporate governance 
responsibilities, we resort to an institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al., 2012).  
Institutional logics have received increased attention in managerial corporate governance 
studies (Aguilera, Judge, & Terjesen, 2018; Chung & Luo, 2008; Jansson, 2013; Joseph, 
Ocasio, & McDonnell, 2014; Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010). Thornton and Ocasio defined 
institutional logics as “socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, 
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their 
material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999 : 804). Institutional logics therefore refers to the guiding principles 
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that match symbolic constructions to material practices (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton 
& Ocasio, 2008). Multiple institutional logics can coexist or compete in a same organizational 
field (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Thornton, 2002).  Some 
studies have then described the diffusion of corporate governance principles such as 
shareholder value (Lok, 2010) or board independence (Shipilov et al., 2010) through the 
institutional logics lenses. Other studies have analyzed diverging national corporate governance 
models as institutional logics (Aguilera et al., 2018; Chung & Luo, 2008). The institutional 
logic perspective hence helps to explain organizational practices, and in particular 
heterogeneous organizational practices, as responses to institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 
2010; Pache & Santos, 2013).  
 
In this paper, we analyze institutional investors’ corporate governance behaviors as a field 
subject to different institutional logics. Legal scholars have argued that stewardship codes do 
not follow precise and consistent theoretical guidelines.  Law as a form of institution, has 
proven to be ambiguous and to allow a wide range of organizational practices (Edelman, 1992; 
Suchman & Edelman, 1996). We hence break down the new responsibilities enforced on 
institutional investors through institutional logics lenses. In particular, we contend that 
regulators rely on two coexisting logics of responsibility which have replaced a primary logic.  
This analysis provides a first conceptual mapping of institutional investors’ corporate 
governance responsibilities.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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i. Agent logic 
A liability regime describes the precise conditions and situations when an individual or an 
organization is liable for the effects of its actions. Liability regimes seek to prevent specific sets 
of actions. Similarly normative (and even non-legal) responsibilities assume that there are 
actions that can be labelled as irresponsible. Therefore, as stewardship codes assign corporate 
governance responsibilities to institutional investors, they make the implicit assumption that 
irresponsible investor corporate governance behaviors exist. We have seen that recent legal 
trends support the “good activism” hypothesis.  We explain “bad activism” and then 
irresponsible behavior in corporate governance by exhibiting a primary institutional logic that 
applies on institutional investors.  
 
Stewardship codes insist on the importance of managing conflicts of interest and of putting 
beneficiaries and clients’ interests first (Hill, 2017; UK Stewardship Code, 2012). Conflict of 
interests generally arise when institutional investors have as clients of their investment branches 
corporations in which they own stock (Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2004). Business ties with parent 
companies has been an important source of conflict of interests for mutual funds (Davis & Kim, 
2007; Palazzo & Rethel, 2008). In particular, mutual funds and hedge funds are usually 
investment vehicles sponsored by asset management corporations and many pensions funds 
resort to asset managers who act on their behalf (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Vishny, Hart, & Perry, 
1992). Once they have been mandated by a pension fund,  asset managers are the ones taking 
equity investment decisions and voting shares.  
 
Asset management companies are subject to the same corporate governance logics that their 
investee corporations.  The dominant liberal corporate governance logic is a shareholder 
oriented one (Aguilera et al., 2018), while corporate governance codes are mostly consistent 
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with agency theory (Cuomo et al., 2016).  In a principal-agent perspective, the principals of 
asset management companies are not their beneficiaries nor their clients but of their own 
shareholders. Asset management companies have duties toward their shareholders as much as 
toward their investors (Black, 1991).  
 
We then define “agent logic” for institutional monitoring as the logic prevailing on institutional 
investors whose corporate governance behavior serves the interest of their parent company (if 
they have one) or  prevailing on the money managers who act on behalf of institutional investors 
and whose corporate governance behavior serve the interests of their own shareholders.  This 
specific logic of institutional monitoring shed light on the normative influences that can lead 
institutional investors to engage “irresponsibly”. Irresponsible engagement can then presents 
itself through voting with management when it is not in their beneficiaries’ or clients’ best 
interests or designing voting policies sufficiently flexible for institutional investors to find slack 
and compromise with management (Davis & Kim, 2007). Agent logic explains institutional 
investors and financial intermediaries’ conflicts of interests with their clients’ interests.  
 
ii. Trustee logic 
To prevent the risk of conflict of interests, such as the ones entailed by an agent logic, 
policymakers have compelled financial intermediaries to comply with fiduciary duties toward 
their beneficiaries and clients. For instance, the UK Stewardship Code’s second principle on 
conflict of interests implies that “institutional investors should put in place, maintain and 
publicly disclose a policy for identifying and managing conflicts of interest with the aim of 
taking all reasonable steps to put the interests of their client or beneficiary first” (UK 
Stewardship Code, 2012 : 6). These fiduciary responsibilities refer to trusteeship (Leslie, 2005). 
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Beneficiaries and clients entrust their savings or capital with financial intermediaries who then 
act as trustees for them.  
 
“Trustee logic” has already been identified by Lounsbury as a professional logic for mutual 
funds investing on behalf of their clients (Lounsbury, 2007). He opposed the “trustee logic” to 
mutual fund’s “performance logic”. Mutual fund following a “trustee logic” focused on 
building lasting relationships with their customers- that is to say mutual fund shareholders 
(Lounsbury, 2007).  
 
We define “trustee logic” for institutional monitoring as the logic prevailing on institutional 
investors whose corporate governance behavior serves their beneficiaries and clients’ interests. 
Trustee logic accounts both for investor engagement on behalf of their beneficiaries and clients 
and investor passivity. Institutional investors who comply with their fiduciary duties might not 
have incentives to engage. As we have seen, meeting their beneficiaries and clients expectations 
on portfolio performance can be a barrier to institutional investor activism (Gilson & Gordon, 
2013). Therefore,  expectations for institutional investors’ role in corporate governance 
grounded on  trustee logic cannot guarantee “good activism”. 
 
 
iii. Owner logic 
Nonetheless, we have seen that stewardship codes have expectations that exceed fiduciary 
duties, and then trustee logic, for institutional investors. Both the UK Stewardship Code but 
also the European Directive 2017/828 - which is a case of hard law promoting long-term 
shareholder engagement- proceed from macroeconomic concerns (Birkmose, 2014, 2018; 
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Cheffins, 2010). Policymakers are expecting institutional investors to monitor corporations to 
prevent risk of crisis and enhance value (Hill, 2017).  
 
These expectations evoke a “real owner” logic (Jansson, 2013). Institutional investors are 
expected to act on behalf of the project and the assets in which they have invested.   
In particular, stewardship codes appeal to the common interests of investors and shareholders. 
While promoting collective engagement of investors, the UK stewardship Code points out that 
“collective engagement may be most appropriate at times of significant corporate or wider 
economic stress, or when the risks posed threaten to destroy significant value” (UK Stewardship 
Code, 2012 : 8). Institutional investors are then assumed to have common financial interest that 
they should collectively protect. 
The common interests of institutional investors supports the idea that shareholders of a 
corporation are united and then fit to monitor (Dent, 2010). We have seen that Lord Myners 
called institutional investors during the crisis “absentee landlords” (Cheffins, 2010). The owner 
logic is close to a political vision of shareholders’ assembly (eg. Strine Jr, 2005). Shareholder 
democracy or a republic of shareholder appeal to civic rights and duties (Rodrigues, 2006) 
During the 20th century, this specific image of shareholders, as owners, had grounded claims to 
control rights (Hill, 2000). Nowadays, it used to ground control responsibilities. When asked to 
care, as owners or landlords, for a corporation, and not an investment portfolio, Institutional 
investors are expected to monitor corporations as the separate legal entity that united them to 
their fellow shareholders.  
 
We then define “owner logic” for institutional monitoring as the logic prevailing on institutional 
investors whose corporate governance behavior serves the common interests of their co-
shareholders. Contrarily to trustee logic, owner logic balances the relationship between 
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investors and investees. Corporations are singled out by owner logic. Institutional investors 
who follow an owner logic are concerned with the absolute - and not relative - performance of 
their investee corporations. Institutional investors as owners are also more likely to be 
concerned with their investees’ sustainability. Yet, it does not mean that they have equal 
concerns for environmental and social issues, or even strategies. Expectations for institutional 
investors’ role in corporate governance grounded on owner logic can foster long-term 
shareholder engagement but cannot guarantee corporate social responsibility nor sustainable 
management. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
These three different logics of responsibility for institutional investors’ role in corporate 
governance clarify the multiple rationales and guidelines that recent corporate governance rules 
are pushing on institutional investors. In particular, investor stewardship can refer as much to 
trustee stewardship than to owner stewardship.  
Our conceptual mapping of institutional investors’ different logics of responsibility in corporate 
governance hence allow us to propose a new line of discussion of the notion of investor 
stewardship, and more generally of responsible investor engagement,   
 
Challenges to investor stewardship 
Since “good” institutional investor corporate governance behaviors can be framed by different 
logics, they can result in heterogenous practices. Corporate governance rules on investor 
engagement are then exposed to two types of criticism. First, they can be deemed inefficient 
since institutional investors can find some slack of interpretation to legitimate their behaviors 
and even legitimate shareholder passivity. For instance, trustee logic can be opposed to owner 
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logic to justify the lack of incentives to engage. Second, these normative expectations can result 
in new sorts of risk for institutional investors. Trustee logic could not only conflict with agency 
logic but also with owner logic. Institutional investors would need to manage conflicts of 
interests between their beneficiaries and clients on one hand, and the shareholder community 
on the other hand. Managing rivalry of competing institutional logics imply specific strategies 
(Reay & Hinings, 2009). Coexisting institutional logics can either compete (eg. Thornton, 
2002) or be coupled (Pache & Santos, 2013). Consistent theoretical frameworks for responsible 
investor engagement strategies hence involve designing pathways to balance tensions between 
trustee logic and owner logic.  
 
Custodian stewardship, the regulations’ missing logic  
Our conceptual mapping of institutional investors’ logics of responsibility has helped us shed 
light on the competing rationales within “the case for institutional monitoring”, and the 
unbalances they can create. These unbalances also feed criticism of stewardship codes or of the 
European Directive 2017/828 over responsible corporate governance mechanisms (eg. 
Birkmose, 2018; Johnston & Morrow, 2015). Corporate governance rules for institutional 
investors have strikingly overlooked the issue of management and, in particular, of responsible 
management. Stewardship codes deal less with sustainability issues and “good” management 
than with agency problems and control mechanism (on control and incentive mechanisms in 
stewardship codes see Hill, 2017). Once again law has “forgot about management” (Johnston, 
Segrestin, & Hatchuel, 2018). 
 
 Yet, social welfare concerns within corporations lie within management (Bridoux & 
Stoelhorst, 2016; Jones et al., 2016). Management science and theories have provided multiple 
frameworks and analysis showing the importance of stakeholder management (Bridoux & 
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Stoelhorst, 2016; Freeman, 1984; Freeman & Reed, 1983), corporate social responsibility 
issues (Garriga & Melé, 2004) and managerial self-determination (Davis et al., 1997; Segrestin 
& Hatchuel, 2011) for joint value creation and “social welfare”. However, bringing about social 
welfare doesn’t only require institutional investors to control for ESG issues, as assumed in 
some stewardship codes (Hill, 2017).  
In managerial stewardship theory, if shareholders do not respect some managerial autonomy 
and foster management’s intrinsic motivation, managers will feel frustrated and could be driven 
to behave opportunistically (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship management has organizational 
but also corporate governance antecedents, among which the ability to self-determinate (Davis 
et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012). Adequate managerial discretion is not only a key driver of 
innovative strategies but also regulates the relation between business and society (Segrestin & 
Hatchuel, 2011).   
 
Despite intending to foster sustainable value-creating corporations and management, corporate 
governance rules push logics of responsibility on institutional investors that are not cohesive 
with responsible self-determining management. Trustee and owner logics do not entail a 
respectful approach to management and would, on the contrary, drive investors to pressure 
management to align with the interests that they serve. Therefore, responsible investor 
engagement aiming at social welfare lacks another logic of responsibility, dedicated to the 
firm’s welfare. Management can achieve the firm’s welfare in developing long-term, 
sustainable and responsible strategies. We propose to call this logic oriented toward the firm’s 
welfare a custodian logic of responsibility for institutional investors. This logic completes our 
conceptual mapping of institutional investors’ logic of responsibility and contributes to 
designing a unified framework for institutional investors’ corporate governance 
responsibilities.  
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[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
In management science, the concept of custodianship  has been used to refer to a specific type 
of guardians which are concerned with preserving a collective good (eg. Balmer, 2012; Capon, 
Berthon, Hulbert, & Pitt, 2001; Dacin, Dacin, & Kent, 2018). In corporate governance, 
custodianship illustrates the concern for the firm’s welfare, through for instance, its business 
model (eg. Page & Spira, 2016). We define custodian logic for institutional monitoring as the 
logic prevailing on institutional investors whose corporate governance behaviors serve social 
welfare, and more specifically the firm’s welfare. Custodian stewardship would both endorse a 
collaborative engagement approach to management (eg. McNulty & Nordberg, 2016) and adopt 
a pro-organizational corporate governance behavior. The custodian logic for responsible 
investor engagement would then appeal to the “Cerberus” image of shareholding (Hill, 2000) 
and to the pro-social and other-regarding perspectives of stewardship (Davis et al., 1997; 
Hernandez, 2012). Combining monitoring activities with a concern for the management 
function and its responsibilities constitutes an original path for responsible investor 
engagement. Custodian stewardship could help ground a consistent framework for the “good 
activism” hypothesis in a post-crisis world. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we tackled the notions of responsible investor engagement and investor 
stewardship, and their social underpinnings.   We drew on recent corporate governance rules 
and legal literature to unpack the different rationales behind regulations, such as stewardship 
codes, on investor engagement.  
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These new rules were meant to prevent risks of new financial crisis and to enhance value-
creation. Yet, the notion of investor stewardship has relied on contrasted rationales. Employing 
an institutional logics perspective, we distinguish between institutional investors’ logics of 
responsibility and exhibit in particular two kinds of investor stewardship: trustee stewardship 
and owner stewardship. Trustee investors serve the interests of their beneficiaries and clients. 
Owner investors serve the common interests of their fellow shareholders. These two coexisting 
logics for investor stewardship can conflict and do not guarantee that investor engagement will 
meet social expectations.  
 
We have therefore discussed the notion of investor stewardship. Investor stewardship creates 
new sources of conflicts of interests for institutional investors. Moreover, although social 
welfare and public policy issues supported the initial motives for corporate governance rules 
on investor engagement, its translation into soft and hard laws has been lacking a specific 
rationale aiming at social welfare. We argued that this rationale would go beyond integrating 
ESG concerns within trustee or owner logic and would take into account the specific role and 
responsibilities of management. Indeed, management theories show that responsible 
management also has self-determination antecedents. This has led us to propose a custodian 
logic of responsibility for institutional investors. Custodian stewardship bridges monitoring 
concerns with a pro-social and pro-organizational  perspective. This logic contributes to 
mapping of institutional investors’ logic of responsibility and completes our unified framework 
of  institutional investors’ corporate governance behaviors.   
 
Our contributions are hence twofold. 
First, we contribute to the literature on institutional investor activism by unpacking and 
mapping the different logics that can drive institutional investors’ corporate governance 
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behaviors. We not only considered the logics underpinning corporate governance rules laid 
upon investors but also an agent logic which can explain why institutional investors might not 
follow these rules. Our approach furthers current research on shareholder activism (for a review 
see Goranova & Ryan, 2014) but also completes the precedent analyses of institutional 
investors’ heterogenous behaviors (Connelly et al., 2010; Ryan & Schneider, 2002, 2003). 
While corporate governance rules would aim at unifying institutional investors’ corporate 
governance behaviors, we propose a new classification of these behaviors through the lenses of 
investors’ logics of responsibility.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on corporate governance mechanisms by showing and 
discussing the problems and limits with the “good activism” hypothesis. We not only critically 
examined the notion of investor stewardship but we proposed a new logic of responsibility for 
institutional investors – custodian stewardship- which can path the way to substantial 
institutional investor engagement which could meet social welfare concerns.  
 
Further research would be needed to assess the ways institutional investors manage and 
balances these multiple logics. This would contribute to build a dedicated framework for 
managing investor stewardship’s conflicts of interests and to help design responsible 
engagement strategies. Further research could also explore the custodian logic and its 
implications both for institutional investors and for corporations, through , for example, original 
cases and original practices.  
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Figure 1: Corporate governance rules and mapping of institutional investors’ logics of 
responsibility 
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Figure 2: Custodian stewardship: Toward a unified framework for institutional investors’ 
corporate governance responsibilities  
